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Afghanistan Situation Report

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30 July 1985

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| AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT | |
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| ONI ENTS | |
| SOVIET OPERATIONS IN PANJSHER, OTHER AREAS | 1 |
| Recent Soviet activity has been concentrated | on |
| the Panjsher Valley; insurgent activity, meanwhil <u>e, has picked up in Kabul and other</u> | |
| areas. | |
| ITUATION IN HERAT | 1 |
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| The regime's inability to improve its positi Herat <u>has prompted a</u> nother Soviet sweep of t | |
| area. | |
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| N BRIEF | 4 |
| N DRIEF | • |
| ERSPECTIVE | |
| URISTAN: GATEWAY TO NORTHEASTERN AFGHANISTAN | 6 |
| Nuristan, a rugged area bordering Pakistan, | is |
| typical in many ways of remote regions of | |
| Afghanistan that are not strategic but that provide insurgents with a source of supplies | s and |
| transit. | |
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| This document is prepare | d weekly by the Office of |
| Near Eastern and South A | sian Analysis and the |
| Office of Soviet Analysi | 25X ² |
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| SOVIET OPERATIONS IN PANJSHER, OTHER AREAS | 25x |
| After intensified operations in the Panjsher Valley, Soviet forces apparently are withdrawing. some Soviet motorized rifle and artillery units have left both Bazarak and Rokha and are moving toward the mouth of the valley. Some Soviet forces remain at Bazarak, the northernmost Soviet deployment in the valley. The Soviet withdrawal follows intensified activity that included operations in the Hazara Valley and the deployment of Soviet troops into the upper reaches of the Panjsher Valley. | 25X1 25X1 |
| In other regions, areas of Kabul and the Soviet military complex at Darulaman were rocketed on 16 and 18 July, respectively, according to the US Embassy. In Feyzabad, Badakhshan, guerrilla attacks nearly succeeded in closing the airport, | 25x 25x |
| The crew of two Soviet MI-25 Hind helicopters defected to Pakistan on 13 July, bringing their aircraft with them. Guerrilla spokesmen in Peshawar reported that 131 captured Afghan officers about to be exchanged were killed when Afghan Government helicopters bombed a mujahedin stronghold in the Panjsher Valley. | 25X |
| SITUATION IN HERAT | 25X |
| resistance forces were successful in operations in the first part of this month against Soviet and regime units in Herat. By 10 July, the insurgents controlled two-thirds of the city, and by 17 July, after intense fighting, regime | 25x |
| forces withdrew. major elements of two Soviet motorized rifle regiments had left their garrisons in the Herat area. | 25X1 25X 25X |
| Comment: The regime's inability to improve its position in Herat probably has prompted another Soviet sweep of the area, The Soviets may temporarily suppress the insurgents in the cityprobably at the cost of high casualtiesbut they have insufficient forces to effect | 25X1 25X1 |
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| dramatic improvements in security the | ere. The well- |
| organized insurgent forces in the arc | ea also are likely |
| organized insurgent forces in the arc to concentrate on attacking targets- | -border posts, |
| convoys, and the fuel pipelineleft | undefended while |
| the Soviets conduct urban operations | in Herat. |
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| G-equipped Soviet and another at Shi | ndand airfie | dronsone a ldshave ro | t Bagram tated. | |
| They were replaced equipped squadrons Soviet air combat | , which will capabilities | marginally. | increase | 25X1 |
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| CIA Internal Use Only | |
| PERSPECT IVE | |
| NURISTAN: GATEWAY TO NORTHEASTERN AFGHANISTAN | 25X1 |
| NONZETZIW. WITCHEST IN THE STATE OF THE STAT | 25X1 |
| Nuristan, a rugged area bordering Pakistan, is typical in many ways of the sparsely populated, remote regions of Afghanistan that are not strategic but that provide the insurgents with a safe source of supplies and transit. The Nuristanis are politically independent and generally have remained outside the conflict between the Kabul regime and the insurgents. | 25x1 |
| The Liberation of Nuristan | |
| Nuristan comprises the northern half of Konarha and Laghman Provinces in eastern Afghanistan. The area is inhabited by about 100,000 Nuristanis, one of Afghanistan's smaller ethnic groups. Most of the region is extremely mountainous and well-forested, making it difficult for Soviet and regime forces to penetrate, although armored vehicles can enter the area's three main river valleys on primitive dirt roads. | 25X1 |
| The Nuristanis were the first ethnic group to take up arms against the Communist regime in Kabul after the April 1978 coup. They revolted after Kabul authorities had executed the Afghan Interior Ministerthe highest ranking Nuristani official in the Daoud governmentand arrested a number of local Nuristani government officials, according to a Western observer. During the summer and autumn of 1978, they pushed the Afghan Army and police out of the area's three main river valleys. | 25X1 |
| A government effort to reconquer the region in late 1978 failed. The government organized a militia composed of about 20,000 neighboring Gujars (an Indian people originally from the Gujarat area of the Punjab) and 15,000 Pushtunsthe Nuristanis' traditional ethnic rivalsand promised them that they could pillage Nuristani villages, according to a Western observer. | |

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| Reinforced by three regular Army bath militia pushed its way back into three valleys in October 1978 but was force the spring. Several ineffective bomb Afghan Air Force against several Nurfailed to intimidate the area's inhabitations. | ee main river ed to retreat in bing attacks by the istani villages |
| Independence from Conflict | |
| Since the expulsion of the Afghan Arm been important as an insurgent supply Nuristan's main trails have been used of several routes to the Panjsher Valuortheastern Afghanistan, Tajiks from Badakhshan have been used of the Panjsher Valuortheastern Afghanistan, Nuristan route more often since the Panjsher value of the Panjsher v | y route. d by Tajiks as one lley and to ave also used the Panjsher Valley |
| The Nuristanis have sometimes harasse insurgents but have not actively side | |
| Nuristani groups, who claimed they reindependent Nuristan, were demanding insurgents. | |
| Few Nuristanis have joined Kabul's magovernment funded Sanwar Nuristani, tommander of the Kabul Central Garris Minister Daoud, and sent him to north 1980 to raise a militia to interdict | the former son under Prime nern Afghanistan in |
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| Little Activity Against Soviet and Afghan Fo | ces |
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| Nuristani insurgents have been active only in | |
| Konar Valley, against the Afghan Army outpost Barikowt. | <u>at</u> |
| the most active commander was Jaliatullah Ja | al. who |
| began harassing the Afghan Army outpost in 19 | |
| about 500 armed men and subsequently gained of | |
| a number of villages south of the outpost. | |
| Jalal's insurgents include | |
| 120 Gujars, but that a change in leadership a either ethnic faction could cause this allian | ace to |
| collapse. | |
| | |
| Other Nuristani insurgents have been inactive | |
| they are far from Soviet and Afghan forces. | With the |
| exception of the upper Konar River Valley in Afghan and Soviet troops are located only in | the |
| southern part of Konarha and Laghman Province | |
| Pushtun areas. | |
| | |
| Luckal and Abbaca desiration and the second | handicas |
| tribal and ethnic divisions continue to the Nuristanis. The two main insurgent leaders | |
| Nuristani interior, Mollah Afzal, the leader | of the |
| Kati tribal group of upper Nuristan, and Amil | n Anwuar |
| Khan, the leader of the Kam tribal group of | lower |
| Nuristan, have never cooperated extensively | |
| other or with Jalal in exchanging intelligend information or in attacking Soviet or Afghan | forces |
| The Pushtun Hizbi Islami leader in southern ! | luristan |
| Mollah Rustam, has extended his influence bed | cause of |
| this lack of unity | |
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Outlook

Nuristan probably will continue to have only a minor role in the insurgency. The Soviets and Afghan Government are unlikely to seek military domination of the area in the near term because of its remoteness, rough terrain, and independent populace. Meanwhile, the region will remain important as one of several transit routes for the insurgents, especially the Jamiat.

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| Portrait of the Nuristanis According to Western academics, the Nuristanisonce | 25X1 |
| considered to be descendants of the ancient Greeksare now thought to be related to an earlier people from central Asia. They tend to have lighter features and to be less repressive towards women than other Afghan ethnic groups. | 25X1 |
| The Nuristanis were the last people to be conquered by the Kabul authorities. They were converted forcibly to Islam in 1895 by the King of Afghanistan, who changed the name of their region from Kafiristan (land of infidels) to Nuristan (land of light). The Nuristanis were treated well by the King and proved loyal subjects to him and his successors. Many rose to prominence in the government and military. | 25X1 |
| The Nuristanis traditionally have been on poor terms with their southern neighbors, the Pushtuns and Gujars. According to Nuristani tradition, the Pushtuns siezed most of the best land in the Konar-Kabul basin areas over the last several centuries and forced the Nuristanis into the back valleys and mountains. The Gujars, though less numerous than the Pushtuns, also have been competitors for land. Warfare between the Nuristanis and the Pushtuns was frequent until the Nuristanis' conversion to Islam in 1895. | 25x1 |
| Nuristanis' conversion to Islam in 1895. | 25 |

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